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Abstract:  The aim of this article is to discuss the relation between indigenous and scientific kinds on the basis of
contemporary ethnobiological  research. I  argue that  ethnobiological  accounts of taxonomic convergence-divergence
patters challenge common philosophical models of the relation between folk concepts and natural kinds. Furthermore, I
outline a positive model of taxonomic convergence-divergence patterns that is based on Slater's [2014] notion of “stable
property clusters” and Franklin-Hall's [2014] discussion of natural kinds as “categorical bottlenecks.” Finally, I argue
that this model is not only helpful for understanding the relation between indigenous and scientific kinds but also makes
substantial contributions to contemporary debates about natural kinds.
While philosophical debates about natural kinds often involve folk-biological examples such as
"tiger" or “fish” (e.g. van Brakel [1992]; Dupré [1999]; Soams [2004]; Khalidi [2013]), there is a
surprising  lack  of  philosophical  engagement  with  ethnobiological  research  on  folk-biological
taxonomies (Berlin [1992]; Ellen [2006]; Hunn and Brown [2011]). Instead, philosophers usually
restrict themselves to conceptual analysis of folk-biological terms in ordinary English and do not
even take notice of the vast empirical research literature on the complex biological knowledge of
indigenous societies. The aim of this article is to introduce this literature to current debates about
natural kinds and to develop a general model of the relation between indigenous and scientific
kinds.
Sections 1-3 discuss three models of the relation between indigenous and scientific kinds that are
implicit in the current literature on natural kinds. (1) Universalist realism assumes that indigenous
and scientific taxa refer to the same natural kinds. (2) Revisionism argues that indigenous taxa
diverge from scientific taxa because they fail to refer to natural kinds. (3) Conventionalism suggests
that divergence of indigenous and scientific taxonomies undermines the very idea of natural kinds
and illustrates the conventional character of biological classifications. I argue that none of these
models  provide  a  satisfying  interpretation  of  the  ethnobiological  evidence  about  taxonomic
convergence-divergence patterns. In section 4, I present Slater's [2014] account of “stable property
clusters” (SPCs) as the starting point for a more comprehensive model. Slater argues that SPCs
exhibit  a “cliquish stability” that allow probabilistic inferences from the presence of some sub-
clusters to the presence of others. I suggest that this cliquishness of SPCs can explain convergence
of indigenous and scientific taxa but also leaves room for various forms of taxonomic divergence.
Section 5 suggests that an adequate model of convergence-divergence patterns requires an extension
of this model through a concept of domain-transcending SPCs and “categorical bottlenecks” in the
sense of Franklin-Hall [2014]. Section 6 evaluates the relevance of these findings for contemporary
debates about natural kinds.
1 Universalist Realism
Although  there  is  a  striking  lack  of  philosophical  engagement  with  ethnobiological  research,
universalist  realism can be motivated by philosophical  debates  about  the relation between folk
concepts  and  natural  kinds  in  the  tradition  of  Kripke  and  Putnam.  The  common  picture  of  a
“Kripke-Putnam view” of natural kinds is not without problems (cf. Hacking [2007a]; Williams
[2011]; Wikforss [2013]) but I will ignore these difficulties and only focus on the core idea that
natural kind terms, like names, are rigid designators. The idea of rigid designation is usually applied
to folk categories such as “gold”,  “water”,  or “tiger” and can support a realist  interpretation of
indigenous taxa even in the light of substantial differences between indigenous and scientific beliefs
about biological kinds. For example, a folk-biologist may successfully refer to a natural kind such
as tiger even if she has very limited knowledge or even seriously flawed beliefs about tigers. In
analogy, consider names as rigid designators: I can successfully refer to Shakespeare, even if I have
very limited knowledge or even seriously flawed beliefs about Shakespeare.
If we turn from philosophy to ethnobiology, it is attractive to combine the idea of rigid designators
with the “intellectualist” tradition in ethnobiology (Berlin [1992]; cf. Hunn [2007] for the historical
context) that postulates a universal framework of folk-biological taxonomies. According to Berlin et
al. [1973], folk-taxonomies are based on a hierarchical system of ranks that defines sets and subsets.
All  natural  languages  contain linguistically  recognizable groups of organisms that  vary in  their
inclusiveness: the most inclusive taxa (“unique beginners”) denote animals or plants in general and
are divided in usually not more than six life forms such as bird, tree, mammal, or vine. Generics are
the  most  salient  entities  that  refer  to  natural  kinds  such  as  oak,  pine,  catfish,  robin,  bamboo,
pineapple, platypus. Many but not necessary all generics belong to a life form. According to Berlin,
generics also constitute the most numerous and important taxonomic group with usually around 500
different taxa. Some generics contain further subsets that Berlin et al. label “specific” (e.g.  white
oak) and “varietal taxa” (e.g.  swamp white oak). To sum up, Berlin et al. postulated a universal
hierarchy of folk-taxonomies as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the universal structure of folk-taxonomies according to Berlin et al.'s [1973]
(figure adapted with modifications). Every folk-taxonomy starts with unique beginners (usually  animal and plant) that
are divided in life forms such as bird or tree.  Most generics belong to some life form (level 2)  but there are usually
exceptions of some generics that are not classified as members of a specific life form (level 1). Salient and culturally
important generics are further divided in specifics and varieties. 
Although there is a clear psychological component to intellectualism that interprets cross-cultural
similarities in folk-taxonomies as reflections of our evolved human cognition (cf. Atran and Medin
[2010]),  intellectualism traditionally  prefers  realism over  a  full-blown psychologism.  The main
motivation for a realist interpretation of the intellectualist tradition is that folk-taxonomies do not
only tend to converge on each other but also often converge on scientific taxonomies. In one of the
classical studies on this topic, Diamond [1966] reports that 85% of 110 local bird taxa of the Fore in
Papua New Guinea correspond perfectly to scientific taxa. Following the increasing influence of the
intellectualist programme, ethnobiologists of the 1970s accumulated an impressive amount of data
about  taxonomic convergence from indigenous cultures around the globe (cf.  Hunn and Brown
[2011]). To illustrate this idea of convergence of indigenous and scientific taxa further, consider
Berlin's  presentation  of  ethnobiological  experiments  that  rely  on  simple  sorting  tasks  (Berlin
[1992}, 9-10; cf. Boster [1994] and Nolan [2007] on sorting tasks in general): “Museum skins of
several species of brightly colored Amazonian birds – tangers, barbets, euphonias, puffbirds – all
from the rain forests of northern Peru are dumped from a basket in a heap of a table.” Berlin reports
that his students produce “neatly stacked groups” that are not only remarkably consistent with each
other but also with the stacks of ornithologists as well as the Huambisa and Aguarana Jívana in
northern Peru.  It  certainly seems attractive to explain this  agreement in terms of natural kinds:
Berlin's  students,  ornithologists,  Huambisa,  and Aguarana Jívana find  themselves  in  taxonomic
agreement because they all refer to the same natural kinds.
Intellectualism and natural kind theories in the tradition of Kripke and Putnam seem to provide
mutually supportive evidence for universalist realism. On the one hand, intellectualism provides
empirical evidence of taxonomic convergence of indigenous and scientific kinds and even of nested
hierarchies that match traditional models of natural kinds (cf. Tobin [2010]). On the other hand,
natural kind theories in the tradition of Kripke and Putnam provide a philosophical explanation of
convergence in terms of rigid designation of natural kinds. Upon closer observation, however, the
situation is  much more complicated.  While  intellectualism provided an important  alternative to
simplistic utilitarian models that explained indigenous classification entirely in terms of practical
needs (e.g. “edible plants” or “dangerous spiders”), its generalization to a universalist realism is
clearly  too  strong  and  the  intellectualist  programme of  the  1970's  soon  became  criticized  for
ignoring  or  downplaying pragmatic  factors  in  folk-taxonomy.  As Hunn put  it  in  his  influential
discussion “On the Utilitarian Factor” ([1983], p. 851): “the fact that cultural knowledge of the
natural world might also be of use practically has been treated as besides the point,  almost an
embarrassment […] We have unduly stressed the disinterested intellectualism of our informants,
and as a consequence taken for granted their practical wisdom. Pragmatism is no sin.”
If we look at the current state of ethnobiology, much of the contrast between intellectualism and
utilitarianism has “faded from active academic discussions” (Zent [2009], p. 27) due to constantly
growing  empirical  evidence  of  complex  convergence-divergence  patterns  that  can  be  neither
understood in terms of purely intellectualist or utilitarian models (e.g. Souza and Begossi [2007];
Newmaster et al. [2007]; Shepard et al. [2008]; Cardoso et al. [2010]). While Zent suggests that the
debate faded “without any clear resolution” ([2009], p. 27), a more charitable interpretation may be
that it has become widely recognized as a false opposition: the main task for ethnobiology is not to
discuss  cross-culturally  stable  features  in  opposition  to  local  factors  but  to  integrate  them  in
sufficiently complex models (cf. Ellen [2006], p. 2; Hunn and Meilleur [2010]).
To  illustrate  this  need  for  complex  models  of  convergence-divergence  patterns,  consider  the
example of Tzeltal  Maya in Chiapas. While Berlin et  al.'s  work on Tzeltal ethnobotany was of
crucial  importance  for  the  intellectualist  programme,  it  did  not  provide  evidence  for  perfect
taxonomic convergence. Instead, Berlin et  al.  ([1974], p. 102), report that 61% of Tzeltal plant
generics correspond to scientific species. In a similar vain,  Hunn ([1976]; cf. Hunn and Brown
[2011]) reports 1:1 correspondences of 44% - 92% between Tzeltal animal generics and scientific
taxa depending on a variety of methodological adjustments. More recently, Tzeltal ethnomycology
has become more carefully studied and clearly illustrates the shortcomings of purely intellectualist
or utilitarian models (Lampman [2004]; Shepard et al.  [2008]). While some of the most salient
mushroom-generics  correspond  neatly  with  a  single  scientific  genus  or  family,  other
ethnomycological taxa diverge from scientific taxonomies in the most obvious ways. For example,
macrofungi  are  divided  in  two  life  forms  of  either  “(1)  fleshy  terrestrial  mushrooms;  (2)  and
mushrooms that grow on trees or rotting wood” (Shepard et al. [2008]; 451). Furthermore, obvious
taxonomic divergence is not limited to the rank of life form but also applies to some folk-generics
such as k'aan chay that includes a group of mushrooms (chanterelles, milk cups, hedgehogs) that is
rather heterogeneous from a scientific perspective.
What does this recognition of complex convergence-divergence patterns mean for a philosophical
discussion of natural kinds? While the assumption of rigid designation of natural kinds such as
tigers may be helpful in understanding some indigenous taxa that converge on scientific taxa, it
clearly does not generalize to universalist realism. For example, it is highly implausible to interpret
Tzeltal ethnomycological life forms or generics such as k'an chay in terms a universalist realism
because they do not converge on scientific taxa. Note that it will not help to point out that rigid
designators can successfully refer despite limited or false beliefs about natural kinds such as tigers.
In some cases such as my ethnomycological examples, divergence clearly runs deeper and seems to
imply at some form of “taxonomic incommensurability” (cf. Sankey [1998]) due to the lack of
extensionally equivalent scientific kinds.
2 Revisionism
Universalist realism fails to offer a satisfying interpretation of convergence-divergence patterns in
ethnobiology due to its inability to explain substantive forms of taxonomic divergence. One way of
responding to these the limitations is to endorse a revisionist account of indigenous kinds whenever
we find genuine taxonomic disagreement.  For example,  one could argue that the importance of
utilitarian factors in folk-biological classification shows that indigenous taxa often do not “carve
nature  at  its  joints”  because  they  reflect  pragmatic  and  culturally  relative  interests.  Note  that
“revisionism” in this context has no practical implications such as the suggestion that indigenous
folk-biologists should adopt scientific taxonomies and eliminate utilitarian considerations. Instead,
revisionism makes the metaphysical claim that indigenous kinds qualify as natural kinds only if they
converge on scientific kinds.
Revisionism in this sense seems to be endorsed by parts of the current philosophical literature on
natural kinds. For example, Khalidi ([2013]; p. 59) suggests that “folk categories can be expected
either to coincide with or to be superseded by scientific categories when the purposes for which
they  are  introduced  are  roughly  the  same.”  Khalidi  also  acknowledges  folk-categories  that  are
shaped by utilitarian purposes and still co-exist with scientific taxa but he argues that they do not
qualify as natural kinds: “Speaking generally, it is quite possible that we might introduce categories
that enable us to serve certain desired aims, but do not correspond to the kinds that exist in nature.
In such cases, since there is no direct competition between folk categories and scientific categories,
we would expect the folk categories to coexist alongside scientific ones. But such folk categories
should not be expected to correspond to natural kinds” ([2013], p. 60). In addition to utilitarian
factors,  revisionists  may  also  point  to  evolutionary  considerations  according  to  which  folk-
categories are adaptive but often fail to reflect the causal mechanisms that constitute natural kinds.
For example, de Cruz and Smedt ([2006], p. 364) argue that “lay adults view the world in terms of
intuitive ontologies. While these provide a shallow but fast framework to explain and understand
salient features of the environment, they are epistemologically limited.”
Given that large parts of the current philosophical literature discuss natural kinds as a subset of
scientific  kinds  (e.g.  Ereshefsky  and  Reydon  [2014];  Magnus  [2012]),  one  may  interpret
revisionism  as  the  default  position  in  contemporary  philosophy  of  science.  However,  few
philosophers of science explicitly engage with folk kinds and it may be uncharitable to interpret
them as revisionists. For example, one can avoid revisionism by supplementing the claim that all
natural kinds are scientific kinds with a deflationist reading of “science” that includes indigenous
folk-biologies and other “ethnosciences” (e.g. Lévi-Strauss [1962]; Gorelick [2014]: cf. Magnus
[2012], chapter 5). Whether widely endorsed or not, the crucial question in the current context is
whether revisionism is a plausible position. Prima facie, the incorporation of utilitarian elements
and “special purpose” categories (Berlin et al. [1973]; cf. Ellen [2006], pp. 124-126) in traditional
intellectualist  accounts  give  this  strategy  some  initial  plausibility.  At  least  some  indigenous
categories are shaped by very specific utilitarian concerns and have little use beyond its satisfaction
of a restricted cultural need. For example, Shepard et al. [2008] report  bol lu' as an all-purpose
Tzeltal category of inedible, poisonous, and unknown mushrooms.
However,  not  all  cases  of  taxonomic  divergence  can  be  explained  though  obvious  utilitarian
concerns. Let us consider an example that will elicit revisionist intuitions of many philosophers: the
common (e.g. Atran [1998]; Forth [2010]) assumption of a taxon with the extension of bats and
birds. While such a bat-bird taxon differs from bol lu' in not being reducible to obvious utilitarian
concerns,  one  may justify  revisionist  intuitions  by  arguing that  such a taxon only  reflects  one
superficial property (the ability to fly) instead of real biological discontinuities that characterize
genuine  natural  kinds.  However,  this  response  is  insufficient  as  it  ignores  the  wide  range  of
properties that are typically shared by bats and birds. For example, both typically fly, have wings, a
light bone-structure, a keeled sternum, a similar size range, streamlined bodies, high metabolism,
migratory behavior, similar natural enemies, a fruit and insect-based diet, they disperse seeds in the
environment, reduce local insect biomass, and so on. Atran [1998] shows that Itza' Maya in northern
Guatemala classify bats with birds (ch'iich') and argues that Itza' taxonomy is strongly influenced
by  ecological  relations  that  contrast  with  traditional  western  focus  on  the  internal  structure  of
organisms. Note that similar ecological roles of bats and birds are not limited to rather generic
characterizations such as “seed dispersal” but can be applied to highly specific ecological relations
such as the density of ramon around Maya ruins that it “may owe more to [...] seed dispersal by bats
inhabiting the ruins than to artificial selection by Maya” (Atran [1993], p. 636).
Even if folk-taxa diverge from scientific taxa, they often share a wide range of properties and not
only a specific utilitarian property such as being inedible. This observation is reflected by complex
models  in  contemporary  ethnobiology  such  as  Newmaster  et  al.'s  [2007]  “multi-mechanistic”
approach to ethnobotany of the Irulas in Southern India that identifies three taxonomic primary
mechanisms  (morphology,  ecology,  and  experience)  as  well  as  different  types  of  utilitarian
secondary mechanisms (e.g. nutritional, medicinal, technical or ritual). Even if these mechanisms
are  complex,  they  clearly  differ  from scientific  criteria  and  therefore  do  not  lead  to  universal
taxonomic convergence. One of the most widely discussed aspects of indigenous taxonomies is
their  focus  on  ecological  relations  instead  of  internal  structural  properties.  Assuming  that
indigenous folk-biologists  “concentrate on functional relationships and coevolutionary processes
rather  than  internal  structure”  (Pierotti  [2011],  p.  67),  substantial  taxonomic  divergence  is  an
unsurprising consequence. In response, a revisionist would have to argue that Itza' somehow focus
on the wrong properties and therefore fail to recognize genuine natural kinds. However, even in the
case of a bat-bird taxon, it is not immediately clear how this should work. Arguably, the shared
properties of bats and birds are perfectly real, epistemically significant, and more important than
structural similarities relative to the priorities of Itza'.
In considering possible revisionist responses, let us first get two obvious non-starters out of the way.
First, one may follow traditional natural kind essentialism by requiring intrinsic essences instead of
relational properties such as ecological roles. The obvious problem with this strategy is that it has
become a truism in philosophy of biology that essentialism is wrong. Indeed, many philosophers
have argued that we only have to give up the assumption of intrinsic essences (e.g. Okasha [2002];
LaPorte [2004]) but the alternative of relational essences is compatible with the assumption that
indigenous  kinds  also  have  essences.  Second,  one  may  reject  indigenous  kinds  that  rely  on
ecological considerations on the basis of some general notion of overall-similarity and argue for the
priority of structural similarity. However, there is no reason why indigenous folk-biologists should
agree with the similarity intuitions of revisionists. Furthermore, an account that relies on structural
similarities is also a clear non-starter in contemporary biology given structural differences between
members of the same species with sexual polymorphism (Ereshefsky and Matthen [2005]; Magnus
[2014]) or between many members of the same monophyletic higher taxon (cf. Rieppel [2005];
Boyd [2010]).
A more promising revisionist strategy relies on the widely shared belief that natural kinds must
support  diverse  inductive  inferences  (cf.  Häggqvist  [2005]).  To  know that  an  organism x  is  a
member of the scientific taxon T means that we know a lot about x – about its  history, genes,
anatomy, physiology, behavior, and so on. To know that a mushroom is bol lu' only means that we
can't eat it. However, I have already argued that it is a mistake to assimilate all indigenous taxa that
diverge  from  scientific  taxa  to  utilitarian  categories  such  as  bol  lu'. Instead,  it  seems  highly
plausible that indigenous taxa usually support a wide variety of inductive inferences because they
typically rely on “multi-mechanistic” criteria in the sense of Newmaster et al. [2007] and reflect
deep  knowledge  about  local  environments  and  ecological  dynamics.  Furthermore,  research  in
cognitive science provide direct evidence for the inductive potential of indigenous folk-taxa. For
example,  Bailenson  et  al.  ([2002];  cf.  Atran  and  Medin  [2010],  p.  86)  tested  cross-cultural
differences in inductive reasoning about birds and showed that Itza' resemble western experts in
relying on complex inductive strategies even if their reasoning differs in being strongly influenced
by  ecological  reasoning.  In  fact,  it  is  often  noted  that  indigenous  folk-biologists  can  be  more
successful than western biologists in predicting and explaining local ecological phenomena (e.g.
Pierotti [2011]). Of course, much more can and should be said about the inductive potentials of
kinds. I will return to this issue in my positive model (section 4 & 5) that involves “stable property
clusters” and probabilistic inferences between sub-clusters. Before we address these issues in more
detail,  however,  let  us  consider  a  third  simple  model  of  the  relation  between  indigenous  and
scientific taxa: conventionalism.
3 Conventionalism
Given that neither universalism nor revisionism (nor a combination of both) provides an adequate
account  of  convergence-divergence  patterns,  one  may  interpret  ethnobiological  evidence  as
challenging  the  very  idea  of  natural  kinds.  Maybe,  the  difficulties  are  the  result  of  an  overly
ambitious  metaphysics  that  misunderstands  human  classification  as  a  mirror  of  the  objective
structure of  the  biological  realm.  As soon as  we give up on natural  kinds,  the whole problem
disappears because we can simply accept that the range of human classifications is just as broad and
variable as the range of human interests and preferences.
If we look for philosophical support of this position, it is important to distinguish between two
positions: pluralism and conventionalism. Taxonomic or classificatory pluralism is widely endorsed
in various areas of philosophy of biology (e.g.  Bapteste and Dupré [2013], Barker and Velasco
[2013], Ludwig [2013], Winther [2011]) and my own model of sections 4 and 5 will also turn out to
be thoroughly pluralistic. However, classificatory pluralism in its most general sense only claims
that there is not exactly one fundamental classification but it does not provide a positive model of
convergence-divergence  patterns.  One  possible  specification  is  a  conventionalist  pluralism that
claims that the only standards for the evaluation of taxonomies are conventions that reflect our
contingent interests and purposes. For example, Kitcher ([2008], p. 119) argues that there is “no
higher standard to which our concepts are to answer than the efficient satisfaction of the purposes of
inquiry; those purposes are set, not by nature, but by us.” Applied to ethnobiology, conventionalism
has the obvious advantage of explaining taxonomic divergence. As Dupré [1999] puts it: “there is
no reason to expect folk biological kinds to converge towards scientifically recognized kinds.”
However, there is an obvious problem with this suggestion: even if conventionalists assure us that
we do not have to expect convergence, ethnobiology provides countless examples of convergence
of  indigenous  and  scientific  taxa.  In  some  areas  such  as  highly  salient  vertebrate  species,
extensional agreement between folk-biological generics and scientific taxa can be higher than 90%
(Hunn and Brown [2011]). A conventionalist may respond to these findings by arguing that complex
convergence-divergence  patterns  in  taxonomy  simply  reflect  equally  complex  similarities  and
differences  between  our  interests.  Indigenous  and  scientific  taxa  often  converge  because the
interests  and  therefore  the  classificatory  conventions  of  folk-biologists  and  scientists  often
converge.
Unfortunately, this response will not work. Following Slater [2014], let us assume that a biological
kind Φ (e.g. jaguar) comes with a number of (e.g. morphological, behavioural, genetic...) properties
such as P, Q, R, S, T. Furthermore, let us use brackets (e.g. [Φ] or [P, Q, R, S, T]) to indicate
clustering of properties. In order to make this notation applicable to a comparative discussion of
multiple taxonomies, let us add indices such as [P, Q, R] i or [P, Q, S, T]s for property clusters that
are recognized in different contexts (e.g. by indigenous folk-biologists and scientists). For example,
let us assume that Itza' Maya and zoologists both recognize a morphological (P) and a behavioural
(Q) property of jaguars, while only Itza' recognize an ecological property (R) and only zoologists
recognize a genetic (S) as well as a phylogenetic (T) property. In this case, Φ would come with the
cluster [P, Q, R, S, T] and the recognized sub-clusters [P, Q, R]i and [P, Q, S, T]s.
In explaining taxonomic convergence, a conventionalist can argue that relations between indigenous
and scientific taxa will often resemble this example of [P, Q, R]i and [P, Q, S, T]s in the sense that
recognized  sub-cluster  will  overlap  to  some degree  due  to  overlapping interests  between  folk-
biologists and modern scientists. To illustrate how this can explain convergence, let us consider
three  stamp-collectors  who  employ  different  conventions  in  classifying  stamps.  Collector  A
classifies her stamps by considering their country of origin, issue date, and value while B considers
country of origin, issue date, and shape. Given the overlap between the classificatory conventions,
we should expect at least some convergence of classifications of A and B. In contrast, imagine that
C  classifies  stamps  only  on  the  basis  of  colour.  Given  that  there  is  no  overlap  between  the
conventions  that  are  used by C and by A/B,  it  would  not  be  surprising  if  their  classifications
diverge. In analogy, a conventionalist can claim that convergence-divergence patterns are due to the
partial overlap of interest-relative conventions: indigenous and scientific taxa simply overlap to the
degree that the sets of considered properties overlap.
A closer look at the ethnobiological data, however, illustrates that this analogy does not work. First,
ethnobiologists often find a surprising number of 1:1 correspondences between folk-biological and
scientific taxa such as the 92% that are reported by Hunn ([1975]; cf. Hunn and Brown [2011]) in
the case of Tzeltal vertebrate generics. However, these 1:1 correspondences do  not indicate that
Tzeltal folk-biologists and zoologists focus on near-identical properties. Second, we can also find
taxonomic convergence without any overlap of considered properties whatsoever. Consider jaguars
as  one of  the countless examples  of 1:1 taxonomic correspondence between modern biological
species (e.g. Panthera onca) and folk generics (e.g. b'alum, chak mo'ol, chak bolay, cf. Schlesinger
[2001]). Even if the properties that are recognized by an indigenous folk-biologist ([P, Q, R]i) and a
scientist ([P, Q, S, T]s) partly overlap, we can at least imagine a purely utilitarian taxonomy that
relies entirely on non-overlapping criteria such as likelihood of being attacked (U) or appropriate
behavior in encounters (V). However, even this utilitarian classification that only serves the purpose
of avoiding dangerous animals  would arguably identify jaguars as a taxon that  is  extensionally
equivalent to Panthera onca. In other words: we would find convergence despite no overlap in the
sets of considered properties. The zoologist recognizes [P, Q, S, T]s while the utilitarian taxonomist
recognizes [U, V]u. Still, both end up with extensional agreement and refer to jaguars who typically
have the properties [P,  Q, R, S,  T,  U, V].  While this  result  clearly illustrates the limitations of
conventionalism, it also provides the starting point for a more satisfying model of convergence-
divergence patterns that I will spell out in the next section: biological properties are not randomly
distributed but clustered in a way that knowledge about some properties such as U, V gives us good
reasons to expect other properties such as P, Q, S, T .
4 A Model of Convergence-Divergence Patterns
While  the  idea  of  property  clustering  is  most  prominently  discussed  in  “homeostatic  property
cluster” theories (Boyd [1999]; Craver [2009], Wilson et al. [2007]), I will follow Slater's [2014]
theoretically more modest account of “stable property clusters” (SPC) that avoids commitment to
underlying homeostatic mechanisms or alternative explanations of why property clustering occurs.
The core of Slater's account is the idea that some property clusters are “cliquishly stable” in the
sense that “possession of some [properties] reliably (if imperfectly) indicates the possession of the
whole cluster” [2014]. Consider Slater's example of a clique of Peg, Quinn, Ralph, Sarah, and Tim.
Spotting some of them at the mall gives us good reason to expect the others at the mall, as well. For
example, if we spot the sub-clique [Peg, Quinn, Ralph], we have good reasons to expect the sub-
clique  [Sarah,  Tim]  to  be  there  as  well.  Following  Slater,  we  can  define  cliquish  SPCs  by
introducing a number of sub-clusters [Φ1], [Φ2], [Φ3]..., a notation for probabilistic entailment ,⇒
and a robustness operator ■. Φ will be a cliquish SPC, iff for every x and many sub-clusters:
■ (([Φ1]x  [Φ])  ([Φ⇒ ∧ 2]x  [Φ])  ([Φ⇒ ∧ 3]x  [Φ])  ...)⇒ ∧
The assumption that property clusters exhibit cliquish stability provides a much better explanation
of taxonomic convergence than the conventionalist model that relies on a partial overlap between
the  recognized  properties  in  [Φ]i and  [Φ]s.  Let  us  return  to  the  example  of  jaguars  and  the
assumption  of  three  taxonomies  that  consider  different  properties:  An indigenous folk-biologist
recognizes  the  sub-cluster  [P,  Q,  R]i,  a  zoologist  recognizes  [P,  Q,  S,  T]s,  and  our  imagined
utilitarian  taxonomist  recognizes  [U,  V]u.  While  the  conventionalist  model  fails  to  explain
taxonomic convergence in this case due to the lack of overlap between [U, V]u and [P, Q, R]i / [P, Q,
S, T]s,  the idea of cliquish SPCs offers an obvious explanation.  Assuming a sufficiently  robust
cliquishness  of  the  considered  properties,  we  can  easily  explain  cross-cultural  convergence  of
taxonomies as it is true that for every x:
■ (([P, Q, R]ix  [Φ])  ([P, Q, S, T]⇒ ∧ sx  [Φ])  ([U, V]⇒ ∧ ux  [Φ]))⇒
This idea of cliquish SPCs provides a convenient explanation for the convergence of taxonomies
even in cases where there is no overlap between recognized properties because the presence of one
recognized sub-cluster allows a probabilistic inference to the presence of another non-recognized
sub-cluster, so that for every x:
■ (([P, Q, R]ix  [P, Q, S, T]⇔ sx)  ([P, Q, R]∧ ix  [U, V]⇔ ux))  ([U, V]∧ ux  [P, Q, S, T]⇔ sx))
This idea of cliquish property clustering does not only explain taxonomic convergence but is also
attractive  in  other  areas  of  ethnobiology.  For  example,  consider  debates  about  “traditional
ecological knowledge” (TEK) and its integration with scientific knowledge (Huntington [2000]).
Cliquish property clustering provides a convenient model for at least some types of integration of
TEK  and  scientific  knowledge:  On  the  one  hand,  TEK  often  incorporates  knowledge  about
properties that are not recognized by scientists who are not as intimately familiar with populations
in local environments. On the other hand, scientists  will  often have knowledge about the same
organisms that is not part of TEK. If both sides have knowledge about different properties  of the
same  property  cluster,  both  types  of  knowledge  are  clearly  commensurable  as  we  can  make
inferences from one sub-cluster to another ([Φ]TEKx  [Φ]⇔ sx). For example, TEK about local nesting
places of birds (Gilchrist et al. [2005]) or migratory behavior of beluga whales (Huntington [2000])
will integrate with scientific knowledge about the same birds or whales because they constitute
different types of knowledge about the same SPCs.
Even if the idea of cliquish SPCs offers a helpful model of convergence, integration of TEK and
scientific knowledge will not always be smooth and can also turn out to be impossible. Although
this  article  barely  touches  the  wider  context  of  taxonomic  divergence  through  embedding  in
“assemblages of heterogeneous practices” (Watson-Verran and Turnbull [1995], p. 118; cf. Deleuze
and Guattari [1980] for the notion of “assemblages”), a comprehensive model will have to leave
room for various sources of divergence from slight differences in explanatory interests to radically
different social contexts such as stateless tribal polities in New Guinea (Sillitoe [2002]) and modern
biopolitics (e.g. Foucault [2006]). While my abstract formulation of a SPC-based model does not
spell out these complex factors, it leaves room for at least four sources of taxonomic divergence.
First, taxonomic divergence can occur because a category does not refer to a SPC at all. Think of
Tzeltal ethnomycological category of bol lu' as an all-purpose category for inedible, poisonous, and
unknown mushrooms. Members of the  bol  lu' category arguably do not  form a stable property
cluster that would allow us to make probabilistic inferences from one sub-cluster to another as
macrofungi  of  the  bol  lu' category  only  share  the  property  of  being  useless  to  Tzeltal.  More
generally,  we  will  find  many  categories  that  involve  socially  important  properties  but  do  not
constitute SPCs and therefore give us no reason to expect taxonomic convergence.
Second, taxonomic divergence can occur because only indigenous folk-biologists or scientists have
knowledge of a SPC. For example, Newmaster and Ragupathy's [2010] propose an “ethnobotany
genomics” that relies on DNA barcoding methods as a common tool for plant identification. In one
of their studies, Ragupathy et el. [2009] focused on the grass genus Tripogon in the Western Ghats
of  southern India and compared scientific  knowledge with  TEK of  local  Irula  informants.  The
research  not  only  revealed  slight  taxonomic  differences  (seven  species  according  to  scientific
knowledge,  eight  according  to  local  TEK)  but  subsequent  DNA  barcording  identified  the
scientifically unrecognized taxon sunai pul as a separate species (Tripogon cope). In clear contrast
to bol lu’, taxonomic convergence in this case was not due to a lack of stable property clustering but
through limited scientific knowledge.
Third, taxonomies can diverge because a SPC is recognized but not considered relevant from either
indigenous or scientific perspective. For example, recall my example of a bat-bird taxon. I have
argued that bats and birds share a large variety of properties and its plausible to assume that they
constitute  a  SPC that  it  is  at  least  somewhat  cliquishly  stable  due to  convergent  evolution  of
powered flight and adaption to a flying lifestyle. Modern scientists may acknowledge this clustering
but not deem it of taxonomic importance.
Fourth, Slater's framework of SPC suggests a less obvious but highly relevant source of taxonomic
divergence. Recall that SPCs require a sufficiently robust form of cliquishness. Clearly, we should
not require that cliquish stability holds in all (empirically or even logically) possible situations as
there  may  very  well  be  circumstances  in  which  cliquish  stability  breaks  down.  For  example,
consider a medical kind and the relation between symptoms [A, B, C] and underlying causes [D, E].
Under normal circumstances, [A, B, C, D, E] come as a clique so that we can use [A, B, C] as an
indicator for [D, E] and vice versa.  Let us assume, however,  that medical treatment breaks the
clique apart by suppressing the symptoms without treating the underlying causes. Still, it seems to
reasonable  to  consider  [A,  B,  C,  D,  E]  a  cliquish  SPC.  Even  if  SPCs do not  have to  exhibit
cliquishness under all circumstances, however, we do want to cliquishness to be sufficiently robust
in relevant circumstances. For example, if symptoms [A, B, C] indicate the presence of [D, E] only
under very specific circumstances we would not want to consider [A, B, C, D, E] as a cliquish SPC
in general.
How do we distinguish between relevant and irrelevant circumstances? Slater suggests that this
question has to be ultimately answered relative to domains of inquiry in the sense that property
clusters “are cliquishly stable for a given science, project, research programme, or what have you”
[2014]. Ethnobiology arguably provides an abundance of examples for domain-relativity as debates
about “local ecological knowledge” (LEK) illustrate (e.g. Gilchrist [2005], Anadón [2009], Davis
and Ruddle [2010]). For example, consider my earlier example of Tzeltal ethnomycology. Even if
bol lu' does not qualify as a SPC, other taxa may refer to property clusters that are cliquishly stable
in the domain of Tzeltal mycology. 
Consider  the  Tzeltal  mushroom taxon tsa'  wakax  that  does  not  correspond  with  any  taxon  in
scientific mycology (Lampman 2004). Members of this taxon usually share a number of properties
such as being small, of brownish color, short-lived, inedible, having gills, well-developed stipes,
thin stalks, they grow on grasslands, shrivel up in the sun, have no cultural use, are found between
June and October, and so on. Tsa' wakax is a SPC for the domain of Tzeltal ethnomycology if sub-
clusters (say [brownish color, thin stalk, grows grasslands] or [short-lived, gills,  well-developed
stipe, found in July]) allow a probabilistic inference to tsa' wakax in general and therefore to other
properties that are associated with tsa' wakax (e.g. being inedible, not found in spring). However,
that does not mean that tsa' wakax also qualifies as a SPC in the domain of scientific mycology. If
we consider the range of circumstances that are relevant for a mycologist who is not exclusively
interested in the highlands of Chiapas, the cliquish stability of the mentioned properties arguably
breaks down as there will be environments in which [brownish color, thin stalk, grows grasslands]
or [short-lived, gills, well-developed stipe, found in July] is not a reliable indicator for the other
properties that are associated with tsa' wakax. In other words: tsa' wakax may be a SPC relative to
the domain of Tzeltal ethnomycology but is arguably not a SPC relative to the domain of scientific
mycology. Or, more generally: given that indigenous taxonomies are at least partly shaped by a
highly specific LEK that is adapted to its unique environment, we can predict that many taxa will be
cliquishly-stable only relative to this specific LEK-domain.
5 Domain-Transcendence and Categorical Bottlenecks
In the last  section,  I  argued that  cliquish SPCs allow us to  understand convergence-divergence
patterns in ethnobiology. While convergence is understood through the cliquish-stable clustering of
properties, there remain various sources of taxonomic divergence. However, one may worry that the
different parts of my model do not fit together. In the beginning of the last section, I suggested that
cliquish-stable  clustering  of  properties  can  ensure  taxonomic  convergence  across  domains  of
inquiry. A zoologist may recognize the sub-cluster [P, Q, S, T] of a kind such as jaguar but not [P, Q,
R] while an Itza' recognizes [P, Q, R] but not [P, Q, S, T]. However, their taxonomies still converge
because [P, Q, R, S, T] is a domain-transcending clique. If we can understand cliquishness  only
relative to a domain of inquiry, however, it becomes unclear how we can make sense of cliquish
stability of [P, Q, R, S, T] across domains of inquiry.
In  order  to  understand  taxonomic  convergence  despite  domain-relativity,  let  us  return  to  the
example of jaguars and the observation that jaguars are recognized by both Itza' and zoologists. Let
us assume that Itza' recognize a number of (e.g. morphological, behavioural, ecological...) property
sub-clusters [Φ1]i, [Φ2]i, [Φ3]i... that are reliable predictors for jaguars given the set of circumstances
(Ci1, Ci2, Ci3  ...) that are relevant to Itza'. Following the idea of domain-relative SPCs, jaguar is a
SPC for the domain of Itza' folk-biology as for every x:
(( Ci1  C∨ i2  C∨ i3...) → (([Φ1]ix  [Φ])  ([Φ⇒ ∧ 2]ix  [Φ])  ([Φ⇒ ∧ 3]ix  [Φ])  ... )⇒ ∧
This formulation can be easily modified to incorporate cross-domain stability. Let us assume that
modern  zoologists  consider  the  set  of  circumstances  (Cs1, Cs2, Cs3  ...)  relevant.  The  set  of
circumstances that is relevant to zoologists may be considerable larger than the set of circumstances
that is relevant to Itza'. For example, it will also include environmental conditions that are only
found in South American habitats of jaguars and are therefore not relevant to Itza'.  Even if we
consider the broader set of circumstances that are relevant to zoologists, however, it may still turn
out that many of the sub-clusters that recognized by Itza' remain reliable indicators for jaguars. In
this case, the conditional remains true if we replace the circumstances that are relevant to Itza' with
the circumstances that are relevant to zoologists, so that for every x:
(( Cs1  C∨ s2,  C∨ s3..) → (([Φ1]ix  [Φ])  ([Φ⇒ ∧ 2]ix  [Φ])  ([Φ⇒ ∧ 3]ix  [Φ])  ...)⇒ ∧
The robust  cliquishness  of  a  SPC relative  to  an  alternative  set  of  circumstances  illustrates  the
possibility of a domain-transcending SPC. Φ is a domain-transcending SPC for a range of domains
d1, d2 … dn iff cliquish stability remains robust across the circumstances that are relevant for the
entire range of domains. For example, jaguar is a domain-transcending SPC for the domains of Itza'
folk-biology  and  modern  zoology  because  some  sub-clusters  that  are  recognized  by  Itza'  will
reliably pick out jaguars under the circumstances that are considered relevant for zoologists (and
vice versa). For example, a cluster of morphological and/or behavioural properties of jaguars that
are  recognized by Itza'  would  also serve as  a  reliable  indicator  for  jaguars  in  South American
environments that are relevant to modern zoologists but not to Itza'. In contrast, taxa that are unique
in a specific LEK such as ethnomycological taxon  tsa' wakax may not be a domain-transcending
SPC for a range of domains that also includes modern mycologists because the cliquish stability
breaks down in environments that are not relevant to the LEK of Tzeltal Maya.
While the distinction between between domain-relative and domain-transcending SPCs is helpful
for a discussion of the relation between taxonomies, it is unfortunately not sufficient to explain
convergence-divergence  patterns.  For  example,  recall  my  incomplete  list  of  properties  that  are
typically shared by bats and birds: they fly, have wings, a light bone-structure, a keeled sternum, a
similar  size  range,  streamlined  bodies,  high  metabolism,  migratory  behavior,  similar  natural
enemies, a fruit and/or insect-based diet, they spread seeds in the environment, reduce local insect
biomass, and so on. I suggested that a bat-bird taxon may qualify as a SPC for Itza' Maya due to the
cliquish  clustering  of  properties  that  are  the  result  of  convergent  evolution.  Contrary  to  the
ethnomycological  Tzeltal  taxon  tsa'  wakax,  however,  a  bird-bat  taxon  is  recognized  by  many
societies around the globe and arguably not only robust in circumstances that are relevant to Itza'. It
may therefore turn out that a bat-bird taxon refers to a domain-transcending SPC.
Even if a bat-bird taxon refers to a domain-transcending SPC, however, zoologists will deny its
taxonomic  relevance  and  may  even  reject  it  as  paradigmatic  case  of  a  classification  that  is
epistemologically  dubious  because  it  conflicts  with  the  study of  evolution  (cf.  Love  2008).  In
contrast,  Itza'  may  consider  shared  properties  (e.g.  ecological  roles)  of  bats  and  birds  more
significant  than the structural or evolutionary similarities between bats and other  mammals (cf.
Atran 1998). If a bat-bird taxon refers to a domain-transcending SPC, we have to acknowledge that
only some domain-transcending SPCs actually lead to taxonomic convergence. In the following, I
will assume that taxonomic convergence requires not only domain-transcending cliquishness but
also domain-transcending epistemic relevance. If a SPC satisfies this additional epistemic criterion,
I will call it a “bottleneck SPC.” The notion of a bottleneck follows Franklin-Hall's [2014] recent
suggestion that we should understand natural kinds as “categorical bottlenecks” that “not only best
serve us, with our idiosyncratic aims and cognitive capacities, but also those of a wide range of
alternative agents.”
Before we have a closer look at some of the philosophical implications of this combination of SPCs
and categorical bottlenecks, let us quickly get a terminological issue out of the way. While Slater
[2014] talks about domains of inquiry,  Franklin-Hall  focuses on agents with different aims and
capacities. There may be important differences between both formulations but at least for the sake
of my present discussion, I will assume that different domains in the sense of Slater come with
different agents in the sense of Franklin-Hall. If a SPC is cliquishly stable for a chosen range of
domains (e.g. Itza' folk-biology and zoology) it is also cliquishly stable for a corresponding range of
agents (e.g. Itza' folk-biologists and zoologists). Franklin-Hall's notion of agents may be more fine-
grained in the sense that a domain of inquiry may come with agents who have different aims but for
now that does not matter.
The idea that only some domain-transcending SPCs qualify as categorical bottlenecks is clearly
helpful for a discussion of examples such as my bat-bird taxon. Even if a bat-bird taxon qualifies as
a  domain-transcending SPC,  it  clearly  doesn't  serve  the  epistemic  aims  of  most  biologists  and
therefore fails to satisfy Franklin-Hall's characterization. This does not mean that a bat-bird taxon
does not serve any epistemic aims whatsoever. Given that the epistemic aims of Itza' (and many
other indigenous societies) importantly include the understanding of ecological relations but do not
not include understanding of genetic or phylogenetic properties, a bat-bird taxon appears perfectly
legitimate.
To sum up, it seems that we should distinguish between three types of SPCs: (a) local SPCs that are
cliquishly stable for a given domain, (b) domain-transcending SPCs that are cliquishly stable across
a range of domains, (c) bottleneck SPCs that are that are cliquishly stable and serve epistemic aims
of inquirers across a range of domains. With this fully developed SPC-based model, we clearly have
an account of convergence-divergence patterns that is vastly superior to the simple models that I
discussed  in  the  first  half  of  the  article.  Like  universalism,  the  SPC-based  model  explains
convergence  of  indigenous  and  scientific  taxonomies  but  it  also  leaves  room  for  substantial
taxonomic divergence.  Like  revisionism,  the SPC-based model  allows that some folk-biological
categories such as bol lu'  are “merely” utilitarian but it also leaves room for diverging indigenous
taxa  that  incorporate  complex  knowledge  about  the  structure  of  the  biological  realm.  Like
conventionalism, the SPC-based model stresses the importance of contingent and culture-relative
factors but it does not reduce classifications to conventions. By avoiding the limitations of these
simple  models,  the  SPC-based  account  offers  a  nuanced  picture  that  provides  a  variety  of
explanations for different convergence-divergence patterns (cf. Table 2).
Jaguar (b'alum, 
Panthera
sunai pul, 
Tripogon cope
Bat-Bird 
(ch'iich'..) tsa' wakax bol lu'
onca...)
SPC in one domain x x x x
SPC   in   several x x x
domains
Bottleneck SPC x x
Table 2: Five taxa discussed in sections 4 & 5 relative to a range of domains that includes various
indigenous (Itza', Tzeltal, Irula) and scientific domains of inquiry.
6 Convergence and Natural Kindness
In the past two sections, I used Slater's account of cliquish SPCs and Franklin-Hall's account of
“categorical bottlenecks” to develop a model of taxonomic convergence-divergence patterns that
sheds light on the relation between indigenous and scientific kinds. Even if engagement with recent
ethnobiological research is an interesting (and so far almost non-existent) project in philosophy of
science, Slater's and Franklin-Hall's intentions are quite different as they both aim at a general
characterization of natural kinds. As Slater [2014] puts it: “my account […] is, I think, an attractive
candidate for a general natural kind concept, able to accommodate the diversity of natural kinds we
find in the world.” In a similar vein, Franklin-Hall [2014] “argue[s] that natural kinds be identified
with ‘categorical bottlenecks’ .”
Even  if  my  application  of  Slater's  and  Franklin-Hall's  accounts  is  fruitful  for  a  discussion  of
ethnobiology, it can lead to worries about these more traditional philosophical goals. Recall that I
suggested that domain-relative SPCs are not unique to scientific classification but also ubiquitous
in indigenous taxonomies and even in highly specialized forms of LEK that are adapted to unique
environments and social contexts. Given that Slater presents SPCs as a general characterization of
“natural kindness”, my applications may seem to inflate the notion of natural kinds by arguing for
SPCs in highly specific LEK-settings. Furthermore, my discussion of domain-transcending SPCs
will  hardly  ease  these  worries  as  I  have  argued  that  even  a  bat-bird  taxon  may  be  domain-
transcending for a range of domains that includes modern biology.
Slater  [2014]  anticipates  metaphysical  worries  about  domain-relativity  and  suggests  that  one
possible response is to stress “the convergence of different systems of classification on the same
categories”  and  the  “robust  epistemic  role”  of  categories  despite  variation  of  epistemic  aims.
Clearly, these suggestions match my addition of categorical bottlenecks to the SPC-based model. At
the same time, my notion of bottleneck SPCs will provide little comfort to philosophers who look
for a metaphysically ambitious notion of natural kinds. Indeed, I have suggested that taxa that are
tied to specific LEKs and taxa that do not serve the epistemic aims of scientists do not qualify as
bottleneck SPCs. However, they do not qualify because we defined the range of relevant agents in a
specific way. For example, we could also use a range of agents that only includes folk-biologists
who recognize a bat-bird taxon. Relative to this range, a bat-bird taxon would arguably qualify as a
bottleneck  SPC.  Even  some  highly  specialized  LEK-taxa  such  as  tsa'  wakax may  qualify  as
bottleneck SPCs if we define a sufficiently narrow range relevant agents such as Tzeltal and other
Highland Maya groups in Chiapas such as Tzotzil (cf. Shepard et al. [2008]).
At this point, one may suggest that my account of bottleneck SPCs misses a philosophically crucial
aspect of Franklin-Hall's model of categorical bottlenecks. I have assumed that we simple define a
range of agents relative to whatever convergence-divergence patterns we're interested in. While I
have focused on indigenous and scientific kinds, one may also define the range of agents differently
in alternative research projects such as, for example, a comparison of classifications in evolutionary
zoology and zoological ecology, Tzeltal and Tzotzil ethnomycology, Pre-Darwinian taxonomies,
psychiatric classification manuals, and so on.
In contrast, Franklin-Hall [2014]) does not assume that we simply define the range of agents but
instead introduces an “epistemic agent space” that specifies distance between agents in terms of
shared epistemic interests and capabilities. The set of relevant agents can be understood as the “set
of neighboring agents” that can “itself be understood via an ‘epistemic agent space’ in which those
located near to one another enjoy very similar aims and capacities, while those progressively farther
away differ more substantially along either or both of these dimensions. The neighboring agents are
those within some threshold of closeness to us. I conjecture that we can grasp the space’s structure
intuitively.”
Unfortunately, I think that there are two reasons why this epistemic agent space will fail to ease
worries of ambitious metaphysicians regarding bottleneck SPCs. First, it is far from clear that this
agent space excludes my metaphysically controversial examples such as regional and LEK-specific
natural  kinds.  For  example,  who are  the neighbouring agents  of  a  Tzeltal  folk-biologist?  First,
Tzeltal  folk-biologists  in  neighbouring  villages  that  often  use  slightly  different  classifications.
Second, Tzotzil folk-biologists who rely on a similar ethnomycological taxonomy (Shepard et al.
2008). Third, other Highland Maya groups. If some LEK-specific taxa are stable for most Highland
Maya, however, it is not clear why they should not qualify as natural kinds in the sense of Franklin-
Hall's epistemic agent space. In response one may suggest that a range of Highland Maya agents is
too narrow to satisfy Franklin-Hall's requirement of “a wide range of alternative agents.” However,
there are also taxa such as my bat-bird taxon that are recognized not only in a regional set of LEKs
but globally by various agents with a considerable range of epistemic interests and capabilities.
In addition to these difficulties with supposedly unnatural folk kinds such as a bat-bird taxon, an
ambitious natural kind theorist will also remain unsatisfied with the structure of the epistemic agent
space. Arguably this is not only because we somehow have to define the required range that is
“ultimately relative to us” (Franklin-Hall [2014]) but also because positions in the epistemic agent
space are arguably relative to our priorities. Franklin-Hall appeals to an intuitively grasped structure
and suggests that we see “immediately that an inquirer aiming only to elucidate patterns in the
relative  speed  of  animal  locomotion  is  further  from us  than  one  with  all  of  our  aims,  except
disregarding the behavior of wombats.” Sure, but our intuitions in this example clearly derive from
the way it is constructed – either we share almost all aims or we share almost no aims with the
alternative agents. How do we measure epistemic distance between alternative agents who are not
convenient philosophical inventions but share diverse and partly overlapping aims and capabilities?
Assuming that we cannot simply quantify over shared epistemic aims, we have to evaluate their
relevance in order to determine distance in Franklin-Hall's epistemic agent space. However, it is
difficult to see how such an evaluation could work independently for our contingent priorities. This
problem becomes even more pressing given that Franklin-Hall assumes that we have to consider
both  aims  and capabilities.  How do we weigh  shared  aims  (e.g.  of  community  ecologists  and
indigenous folk-biologists, cf. Pierotti [2011]) against differences in capabilities? While Franklin-
Hall's idea of an intuitively grasped epistemic agent space may be a useful heuristic, there is little
reason to believe that it offers some objective account of epistemic distance between agents.
Does this mean that categorical bottlenecks and SPCs fail to provide a satisfying account of natural
kinds? Well, it obviously depends on our expectations regarding the notion of natural kinds. In its
most  moderate  variant,  a  notion  of  natural  kinds  comes with  the  goal  of  an  “epistemology of
classifying  natural  phenomena”  (Love  [2008],  cf.  Brigandt  [2011])  instead  of  metaphysical
ambitions.  Both  SPCs  and  categorical  bottlenecks  can  make  useful  contributions  to  our
understanding of classification as my discussion of convergence-divergence patterns illustrates. If
we limit ourselves to epistemological goals, there is no reason to doubt the importance of both SPCs
and categorical bottlenecks. In fact, my discussion suggests that we may actually combine both
accounts to specify “three shades of natural kindness”: domain-relative SPCs, domain-transcending
SPCs, and bottleneck SPCs.
In addition to these epistemological considerations, the suggested SPC-based model arguably also
carries at least some metaphysical weight by providing an alternative to a purely conventionalist
model. Clearly, classification in a SPC-based model does not reduce our conventional choices but
has to be understood in relation to empirically discovered property clusters. Even domain-relative
SPCs of very specific LEKs such as  tsa'  wakax reflect empirically discovered structures of the
biological realm in a temporally and spatially restricted environment. If the metaphysical ambition
is merely to show that classification of natural phenomena does not reduce to conventions, a SPC-
based model arguably provides a helpful framework.
Many traditional accounts of natural kinds, however, clearly aim at much stronger metaphysical
goal of identifying a restricted set of genuinely fundamental and interest-independent natural kinds.
Both Slater and Franklin-Hall acknowledge that their accounts do not satisfy the demands of this
strong natural kind realism. Still, a philosopher with more ambitious metaphysical goals may argue
that this only illustrates that SPCs and categorical bottlenecks are not sufficient to capture genuine
“natural  kindness”.  While  I  share  Slater's  and  Franklin-Hall's  skepticism  regarding  such  a
metaphysically ambitious natural kind realism, I also assume that the presented SPC-based model is
at  least  logically  independent  from these  metaphysical  issues.  A SPC-based  model  provides  a
helpful  framework  for  thinking  about  taxonomic  convergence-divergence  patterns  no  matter
whether we abandon the notion of natural kinds altogether (e.g. Hacking [2007b]; cf. McLeod and
Reydon [2013]), interpret the suggested types of SPCs (domain-relative, domain-transcending, and
bottleneck) as different “shades of natural kindness”, or aim at some more ambitious metaphysics of
natural kinds.
Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Roy Ellen, Philip Kitcher, Marcus Ohlström, Shashikala
Srinivasan, and the members of the Columbia University Visiting Scholar Workshop for helpful 
comments on an earlier version of this article. 
David Ludwig
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam,  Netherlands
davidundludwig@gmail.com
References
Anadón, J. D. et al. [2009]: 'Evaluation of Local Ecological Knowledge as a Method for Collecting 
Extensive Data on Animal Abundance', Conservation Biology, 23 (3), pp. 617-625.
Atran, S. [1993]: 'Itza Maya Tropical Agro-Forestry', Current Anthropology, 34 (5), pp. 633-700.
———. [1998]: 'Folk Biology and the Anthropology of Science: Cognitive Universals 
and Cultural Particulars', Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21 (4), pp. 547-569.
Atran S. and D.L. Medin, [2010]: The Native Mind and the Cultural Construction of Nature. 
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Bailenson, J. N et al. [2002]: 'A bird's eye view: biological categorization and reasoning within and 
across cultures', Cognition, 84 (1), pp. 1-53.
Bapteste, E., & Dupré, J. [2013]: 'Towards a processual microbial ontology', Biology & 
Philosophy, 28 (2),  pp. 379-404.
Barker, M. J., & Velasco, J. D. [2013]: 'Deep Conventionalism about Evolutionary 
Groups', Philosophy of Science, 80 (5), pp. 971-982.
Berlin B., D.E. Breedlove, and P.H. Raven [1973]: 'General principles of classification 
and nomenclature in folk biology', American Anthropologist 75 (1), 214–242.
Berlin, B., Breedlove, D. E., & Raven, P. H. [1974]: Principles of Tzeltal plant 
classification. New York: Academic Press.
Berlin B. [1992]: Ethnobiological classification. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Boster, JS [1994]: 'The successive pile sort', Field Methods, 6 (2), pp. 11–12.
Boyd, R. [1999]: 'Homeostasis, species, and higher taxa', in R. A. Wilson (ed.), Species: 
New Interdisciplinary Essays. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
———. [2010]: 'Homeostasis, higher taxa, and monophyly', Philosophy of Science, 
77(5), pp. 686-701. 
Brakel, J. van [1992]: 'Natural kinds and manifest forms of life', Dialectica, 46(3‐4), 243-
261. 
Brigandt, I. [2011]: 'Natural kinds and concepts. A Pragmatist and Methodologically 
Naturalistic Account ', in J. Knowles and H. Rydenfelt (eds), Pragmatism, Science and 
Naturalism. New York: Peter Lang, pp. 171-196.
Cardoso, D. B. et al. [2010]: 'Correlations between indigenous Brazilian folk 
classifications of fungi and their systematics', Journal of Ethnobiology, 30 (2), pp. 252-
264.
Craver, C. [2009]: 'Mechanisms and natural kinds', Philosophical Psychology, 22 (5), pp. 
575-594.
De Cruz, H. and Smedt, J.D. [2006]: 'The role of intuitive ontologies in scientific 
understanding–the case of human evolution', Biology & Philosophy, 22 (3), pp. 351-
368.
Davis, A., & Ruddle, K. [2010]: 'Constructing confidence: rational skepticism and 
systematic enquiry in local ecological knowledge research', Ecological Applications, 20 
(3), pp.  880-894.
Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. [1980]: Mille plateaux: Capitalisme et schizophrénie. Paris: 
Editions de minuit.
Diamond J, [1966]: 'Zoological classification system of a primitive people', Science, 151 
(3714), p. 1102. 
Dupré, J. [1999]: 'Are whales fish?', in S. Atran and D. Medin (eds), Folkbiology. 
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, pp. 461-476.
Ellen, R.F. [2006]: The categorical impulse. New York: Berghan.
Ereshefsky, M., & Matthen, M. [2005]: 'Taxonomy, polymorphism, and history: An 
introduction to population structure theory', Philosophy of Science, 72 (1), pp. 1-21.
Ereshefsky, M., & Reydon, T. A. [2014]: 'Scientific kinds', Philosophical Studies, 1-18. 
Forth, G. [2010]: 'Symbolic birds and ironic bats', Ethnology , 48 (2),  pp. 139-159. 
Foucault, M. [2006]: Il faut défendre la société.  Paris: Éditions Gallimard.
Franklin-Hall, L. R. [2014]: 'Natural kinds as categorical bottlenecks', Philosophical 
Studies, advance online publication, pp. 1-24. 
Gilchrist, G., Mallory, M., & Merkel, F. [2005]: 'Can local ecological knowledge 
contribute to wildlife management?', Ecology and Society, 10(1), p. 20.
Gorelick, R. [2014]: 'Indigenous Sciences are not Pseudosciences', Ideas in Ecology and 
Evolution, 7, pp. 43-55.
Hacking, I. [2007a]: 'Putnam’s theory of natural kinds and their names is not the same as 
Kripke’s.', Principia, 11(1), pp. 1-24.
———. [2007b]: 'Natural kinds: rosy dawn, scholastic twilight', Royal Institute of 
Philosophy Supplement, 61, pp. 203-239.
Häggqvist, S. [2005]: 'Kinds, projectibility and explanation', Croatian journal of 
philosophy, 13, pp. 71-87.
Hunn, E. [1975]: 'A measure of the degree of correspondence of folk to scientific 
biological classification', American Ethnologist, 2(2), pp. 309-327.
———.[1982]: 'The utilitarian factor in folk biological classification', American 
Anthropologist, 84 (4), pp. 830-847.
 ———. [2007]: 'Ethnobiology in four phases', Journal of Ethnobiology 27 (1), pp. 1–10.
Hunn E.S. and C.H. Brown. [2011]: 'Linguistic ethnobiology', in E.N .Anderson, D. 
Pearsall, E. Hunn, and N. Turner (eds), Ethnobiology,  Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 
pp. 319–333.
Hunn, E. S., & Meilleur, B. A. [2010]: 'Commentary on “Indigenous Ecological 
Knowledge as Situated Practices', American Anthropologist, 112 (2), pp. 351-351.
Huntington, H. P. [2000]: 'Using traditional ecological knowledge in science', Ecological 
applications, 10 (5), pp. 1270-1274.
Khalidi, M. A. [2013]: Natural Categories and Human Kinds. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Kitcher, P. [2008]: 'Carnap and the caterpillar', Philosophical Topics, 36 (1), pp. 111-127. 
Lampman, A. M. [2004]: Tzeltal ethnomycology. Naming, classification and use of 
mushrooms in the highlands of Chiapas, Mexico, doctoral dissertation, University of 
Georgia. 
LaPorte, J. [2004]: Natural kinds and conceptual change. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Lévi-Strauss, C. [1962]: La pensée sauvage. Paris: Plon.
Love, A. C. [2009]: 'Typology reconfigured: from the metaphysics of essentialism to the 
epistemology of representation', Acta Biotheoretica, 57 (1-2), pp. 51-75.
Ludwig, D. [2013]: 'Hysteria, Race, and Phlogiston. A Model of Ontological Elimination 
in the Human Sciences', Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and 
Biomedical Sciences. 45, pp. 68–77.
MacLeod, M., & Reydon, T. A. [2013]: 'Natural kinds in philosophy and in the life 
sciences', Biological Theory, 7 (2), pp. 89-99.
Magnus, P. D. [2012]: Scientific enquiry and natural kinds. Palgrave Macmillan.
———. [2014]: 'NK≠ HPC', The Philosophical Quarterly. 
Newmaster, S. G. et al. [2007]: 'The multi-mechanistic taxonomy of the Irulas in Tamil Nadu, South
India', Journal of Ethnobiology, 27 (2), pp. 233-255.
Newmaster, S. G., & Ragupathy, S. [2010]: 'Ethnobotany genomics-discovery and innovation in a 
new era of exploratory research', Journal of Ethnobiology and Ethnomedicine 6 (2).
Nolan JM, [2007]: Wild harvest in the heartland. Lanham: University Press of America
Okasha,  S.  [2002]:  'Darwinian  metaphysics:  species  and  the  question  of  essentialism', 
Synthese, 131 (2), pp. 191-213.
Pierotti R, [2011]: 'The World According to Is’a', in E.N. Anderson et al. (eds), Ethnobiology. 
Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
Ragupathy, S., et el. [2009]: 'DNA barcoding discriminates a new cryptic grass species revealed in 
an ethnobotany study by the hill tribes of the Western Ghats in southern India', Molecular Ecology
Resources, 9 (1), pp. 164-171.
Rieppel, O. [2005]: 'Monophyly, paraphyly, and natural kinds', Biology and Philosophy, 20 (2-3), 
pp. 465-487.
Sankey, H. [1998]: 'Taxonomic incommensurability', International Studies in the Philosophy of 
Science, 12(1), pp. 7-16.
Schlesinger, V. [2001]: Animals and plants of the ancient Maya. Austin: University of Texas Press.
Shepard Jr, G. H., Arora, D., & Lampman, A. [2008]: 'The Grace of the flood: classification and use
of wild mushrooms among the highland Maya of Chiapas', Economic Botany, 62(3), pp. 437-470.
Sillitoe, P. [2002]: 'Contested knowledge, contingent classification', American Anthropologist, 104 
(4), pp. 1162-1171.
Slater, M. H. [2014]: 'Natural kindness', The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, advance 
online publication.
Soames, S. [2004]: 'Knowledge of manifest natural kinds', Facta Philosophica, 6, pp. 159-81.
Souza, S. P., & Begossi, A. [2007]: 'Whales, dolphins or fishes?', Journal of Ethnobiology and 
Ethnomedicine, 3 (1).
Tobin, E. [2010]: 'Crosscutting natural kinds and the hierarchy thesis', in H. Beebee and Sabbarton-
Leary (eds), The semantics and metaphysics of natural kinds. London: Routledge,  pp. 179-191.
Watson-Veran, H., & Turnbull, D. [1994]: 'Science and other indigenous knowledge systems', in 
Jasanoff et. al (eds), Handbook of Science and Technology Studies. Thousand Oaks: Sage,  pp. 
115-139.
Wikforss, Å. [2013]: 'Bachelors, energy, cats and water', Theoria, 79(3), pp. 242-261.
Williams, N. E. [2011]: 'Putnam's traditional neo‐essentialism', The Philosophical Quarterly, 
61(242), pp. 151-170.
Wilson, R. A., Barker, M. J., & Brigandt, I. [2007]: 'When traditional essentialism fails', 
Philosophical Topics, 35(1), pp. 189-215.
Winther, R. G. [2011]: 'Part-whole science', Synthese, 178(3), pp. 397-427.
Zent, S. [2009]: 'A genealogy of scientific representations of indigenous knowledge', in S. Heckler 
(ed.), Landscape, Process, and Power New York : Berghahn Books.

